Abraham Lincoln’s birth date, February 12, by government decree has been folded in with George Washington’s birth date, February 18, to constitute something called President’s Day. Living in the 1960s in a society that some said had too many national holidays, prompted the view that the United States could trivialize (and commercialize) anything. Anthropologists had suggested this concept much earlier.
In the spirit of fastening unique things together, historians were popularizing the idea that Benito Juarez (1806-1872) and Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) had much in common. It was common in the 1960s, for instance to call Juarez “the Mexican Lincoln.” That is intellectually a much more profitable exploration.
Lincoln, a fledgling politician when he opposed President James K. Polk’s war on Mexico (April 24, 1846 to February 2, 1848), not only sympathized with Juarez’s cause, but was angered by France’s intention (partially concealed but very real) of imposing a Hapsburg Emperor, Ferdinand Maximilian, on the newly created Mexican “empire.” This audacious move not only violated the United States’ Monroe Doctrine but also posed a more immediate threat: French aid to the Confederate cause. Napoleon III bet that Lincoln, tangled in the tragedy of the Civil War (1861-1865) and his resources spread thin, could not come to Juarez’s aid. Napoleon launched an all-out war against the Mexican government – aided by the wealthy Mexican elite, large landowners and the Catholic Church. Many of these factions were blinded by their Francophilia, which would persist until the 1910 Revolution exploded and sent them running.
But the doomed if bloody French occupation of Mexico prompted Lincoln, after a few early victories, to be confident enough to begin sending contingents of troops (most of them poorly commanded) to the U.S.-Mexican border, and, more successfully, sending arms across the border to juarista guerrillas. Europe’s “greatest” army found that they only conquered the ground they stood on at any one time. Meanwhile, Juarez, in his black coach, moved his government to San Luis Potosi, then to Saltillo, and onward, eventually successfully persisting in his fragile, persistent crusade to bring a lawful government to Mexico.
Nevertheless, early on Lincoln put his confidence in a series of often egotistical, indulgent and frequently frightened and incompetent Army officers. General Irvin McDowell was the first disappointment at the battle of Bull Run, which was a humiliating defeat, casting doubt on the new president’s ability to choose military leaders. The fall of Fort Sumter and Bull Run convinced Lincoln that “executive control” had to be taken of the war and its planning. The reach of the often rather symbolic office of Commander-in-Chief had to be expanded so it could exercise necessary, if unprecedented, powers.
The most persistent thorn in the president’s side was George B. McClellan, who graduated second in his West Point class, had some minor victories in Virginia, and was hailed by the press, Congress and much of the public as “the young Napoleon.” Lincoln asked this young celebrity to produce a plan for winning the war. The result was a naive outline that called for 500,000 trained soldiers and required at least six to eight months to prepare. But hidden in this foolishness was a tincture of hysteria, the reluctance to act swiftly and decisively. This military fantasy was also designed to hide the fact that McClellan was already preparing to run against Lincoln in the next election. And he was going over the head of General-in-chief Winfield Scott, hero of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, with feckless complaints. It is true that Scott would prove to be himself too old, too obese, and lacking the energy to direct the war. McClellan’s arrogance was to cause Scott’s resignation. McClellan’s continued over-estimation of the number and strategy of the enemy was to take on the shape of psychosis. And all the time he was calling Lincoln “an idiot.” Yet the president appointed McClellan to take Winfield Scott’s position. He would do this sort of thing again, more than once, giving flawed leaders command of vast numbers of soldiers at critical moments. Scott, McClellan, Generals Henry W. Halleck, Don Carlos Buell, John Pope, Ambrose E, Burnside, Joseph Hooker, William S. Rosecrans – none measured up to what they seemed to promise in experience, apparent energy and initial signs of good judgement.
Often this “prairie lawyer” obviously perceived the elements of coming battle more clearly than his generals. Yet he could learn from them. From General Henry W. Halleck, a student of the renowned European strategist Baron Antoine-Henri Jomimi, the critical need to identify and control strategic points: the Mississippi River, Vicksburg, and the essential factor in this war, one that he understood was a requisite of a strategic plan and that often caused argument among his military staff: the necessity of destroying the enemy’s army, rather than just capturing real estate.
Lincoln was a hands-on president once he aggressively took over as a true war-time commander-in-chief. Hands-on as much as he could be, while staying aware that he could go only so far in overseeing the Union military without sowing interfering doubt among his generals.
At the same time, he spent long hours in the War Department’s telegraph office, in order to carefully monitor incoming telegraphic reports. This was one of the ways he kept abreast of all facets of all significant military efforts. He was bringing a new way of managing – and fighting – this war.