A number of professional international and political analysts have examined Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) President Enrique Peña Nieto’s proposed new policies and found some illuminating but others unpromising. Their assessments are not couched in the sharp rhetoric that many (both Mexicans and those abroad) believe the new administration’s campaign-tainted maneuvering merits.
The foundation of many of these observations issue from:
1) Peña Nieto’s governorship of the large, wealthy State of Mexico which cups Mexico City –a soiled term in office, now newly confirmed (see “The Bribery Aisle,” New York Times, December 17, regarding the crude and predatory corruption exercised by Walmart). And 2) his presidential campaign, which appeared to many political observers almost childishly corrupt and, say many citizens, mirrors the PRI’s previous 71 years of venal and brutal rule (1929-2000).
Yet, simultaneously, a seemingly greater number of Mexicans whose votes were not purchased, muted any unease they harbored, hoping for the best as some prepared for something less. The mainstream media here appears to be of this persuasion also, note a number of journalistic assessors.
However all that may be, today the presidency of Mexico requires that a newly elected president, at least, not make obviously incredible claims on matters of record. Peña Nieto made several claims that the media quickly forced him to recant. The first that caught public attention occurred when he brazenly claimed a miraculous steep drop in the crime rate of Mexico State under his administration. In the rest of the nation, crime numbers were climbing. Mexico State’s change in the way comparative crime rates were tallied accounted for Peña Nieto’s slip-up as he unofficially kicked-off his presidential campaign September 5, 2011. But while retracting his claim, he explained, without being specific, that crime in Mexico would drop if he were elected. Yet more such “errors” were already being drafted.
According to officials, business people and residents of Coahuila, that northern state bordering on Texas has slipped out of the control of the Mexican government and into the hands of the aggressive and brutal Zeta drug cartel. This stunningly dangerous development took place three years ago, and was intermittently reported on by the Mexican media. Yet, few Mexicans out of the state seemed to be aware of this tragedy. And there were no headlines regarding Peña Nieto speaking of this development during his campaign speeches, though he spoke frequently – if unspecifically – about curbing drug gangs. First word of the Zetas aggressive move in coal-rich Coahuila state came in October 2012 from a former governor, Humberto Moreira, who blamed the notoriously violent drug gang for his son’s death. Many people – certainly foreigners – were not aware of the fact that Mexico’s third largest state had slipped from the federal government’s control, deftly and bloodily taken over by the Zetas. This “unimaginable” development shocked many U.S. readers when it was reported by the Los Angeles Times two months ago. Yet as take-over was occurring, “the headlines were rare” across the border. However, Mexico City’s daily Reforma newspaper reported August 31, 2012, that Mexican officials had said the Zetas produced some 10,000 tons of coal a week, selling it at prices that bring a yearly revenue of 22 to 25 million dollars. A major customer has been the government-owned electric company, CFE or Comision Federal de Electricidad, whose logo declares it a “World Class Enterprise.” The Times reported that “(a) businessman whose family has lived here (Coahuila) for generations, said, ‘We are in a state of war, without realizing when or how we got there.’”Tuesday, the Huffington Post and some industrial journals ran a story citing a November 17 Agence Francie Presse report, headlined, “Mexican drug lords strike gold in coal.” It quoted the bishop of Coahuila’s capital, Saltillo, as saying it had long been an “open secret” that drug traffickers had been digging for years, most intently in illegal areas.
As Peña Nieto was organizing his cabinet this week, some people, disillusioned by the reign of the pro-business, pro-church National Action Party (PAN), are studying reports on what to watch out for. Because of the experience of Mexican citizens during the just-ended six-year term of PAN president Felipe Calderon, that means a lot of editing to fit accommodating journalistic space. First of all, notes a former Mexican bureaucrat who, frustrated, migrated to the private sector, Peña Nieto “has to clean up his act (regarding) the truth. Today, too many people are watching and publicly denouncing the old habits of butchering the truth. He could get away with it as the governor of the State of Mexico, but that won’t work as president. Because they voted for a change, a lot of people have doubts about him, particularly when he vows to balance the budget this year.”
That became obvious as soon as people understood that Peña Nieto’s tax reform plan meant levying a value-added tax on food and medicine. As a number of observers note, that will brutally hurt the poor, who make up nearly half the population.
“I don’t think you want to punish that many people the first thing out the gate,” said one foreign businessman who had heard his employees complain about the incessant price hikes on domestic gas. It’s now 361.85 pesos for a 30-liter cylinder. “If you have three, four kids, a cylinder doesn’t last very long, especially in this weather. A lot of people are going out in the fields and hillsides looking for leña (wood) for cooking and keeping warm.” And, he added, “If the epidemic of U.S. flu comes south in a big way, the idea of hanging a tax on medicines will make a lot of people very unhappy.” It’s a bad idea anyway. Former president Vicente Fox tried to introduce it without success.
And Peña Nieto’s promise to reform the government-owned energy sector, meaning Pemex, carries a certain burden of public doubt. As has often been pointed out, when any changes to reform have come up in the past they have had a difficult time, rousing a mixture of doubt, suspicion, and naked opposition. The PRI created Pemex in 1938 when Lazaro Cardenas nationalized the petroleum industry owned by U.S. and British-Dutch corporations. They refused to slightly increase workers pay and add few social benefits. That refusal made Pemex a patriotic symbol and Cardenas a hero. Pemex thus retains its now much-dented status as a symbol of sovereignty. Even though Pemex is widely seen as absurdly corrupt, it has maintained that sacrosanct symbology. The left of the PRI will oppose much tinkering and will water down whatever changes that might near approval.
The PRI party congress is said to be scheduled for the end of February. How far party leaders are prepared to rally behind such reforms will tell voters much. At the same time the president will want to get results before the July 13 state elections, implying that he may try to reach accords before the next session of Congress concludes at the end of April. It will be an early, though possibly not conclusive, test for his political savvy: How fast he can he push Pemex and his fiscal reforms.
During Peña Nieto’s first month in office, approximately 1,000 people were killed in drug-related violence – probably more. Yet he has confidently said he would find a way to bring down the drug war death rate. After all the promises former president Calderon made and all the doomed reassurances his military and law enforcement appointees gave the public, Mexicans are eager for results. As they should be. Just as they should be prepared to act to demand an improvement in the drug war.
(This is the first of a two-part series.)