Canada’s government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper will spend 28 million dollars over three years to call what many Canadians term “surprising attention” to the bicentennial of the 1812 war between a young United States and the British Empire. That war was carried out primarily in Britain’s “North American northern frontier” as it is identified by Jim Guy, professor emeritus of political science and international law at Cape Breton University. (Note for non-Canadian readers: The word Canada comes from the Iroquois word “Kanata,” meaning “village.” A Frenchman, Jacques Cartier, transcribed the word as “Canada,” applied first to the village of Stadacona, then to the whole region of New France. After the British conquest of New France, the colony was renamed the Province of Quebec. Following the American revolution, New France was split into two parts, Upper and Lower Canada, often being collectively, but not officially, known as “the Canadas.” The national title “Canada,” was decided on July 1, 1867, at a conference in London, in which 17 other names were offered, but Canada was unanimously adopted.)
Now a somewhat controversial three-year government-inspired observation will “commemorate” – possibly in Harper’s mind, say some, to “celebrate” – the 1812 war that nobody won. For some Canadians the government campaign is “kind of weird,” as one locally residing Canadian has said. The war, declared by the United States, ended in a stalemate. Today it seems odd, Canadian academicians and journalists have long noted, that in 1812 a “comparatively powerless” United States sought war with an imperial power. But the British had been blocking U.S. shipping from doing trade at French ports during the Empire’s Napoleonic Wars. British warships ran down American merchant galleons, taking possession of them and their cargo, and pressing (polite word for kidnapping) American sailors to meet the Empire’s insatiable need to man its war fleet. The enslavement of U.S. sailors outraged the American public, which pressed President James Madison to declare war. His new nation was weak and had just a paltry, and poorly trained, 12,000-man military. But pressure was fierce and a British colony sat next door.
It was a careless, public-opinion-created war for which the new democracy was gravely unprepared. Its northern neighbor was defended by well-trained veteran British troops. The only thing the United States got out of the encounter was the “Star Spangled Banner,” a moving anthem destined to inspire patriotic Americans in both peace and war.
North of the border, the well-trained and -armed British troops did the fighting, along with veteran Indian warriors. While local militias saw action, Canadian historians note that few “Canadians” were involved. For one thing Canada did not exist. The term Canadian “was still applied mostly to francophones,” says one Canadian researcher. And while the early boast that local militias led the way – aimed at boosting morale and support – has been much debunked, “it still thrives for obvious reasons: pride and politics,” writes one Canadian historical expert. The British military ignored such claims. Their alliances with native tribes were solidified by mutual opposition to anything that looked like an American land grab. The 1814 peace treaty that ended British-U.S. enmity was negotiated in Belgium between the British and Americans There were no “Canadian” representatives.The lessons that the United States learned from its “northern encounter” were harsh. It’s hard to learn from a war you’ve started and lost. This lesson remains exceptional.
The U.S. Military Academy – West Point – was founded on orders from Thomas Jefferson in 1802, and originally was uncertain about its purpose and goals. It was, at first, the only engineering school in the country. Its first cadets also underwent artillery training. But it had few standards for admission or length of study. Cadets ranged in age from ten years to 37 years, attending classes for six months to six years.
Then, after the unprofessional performance of America’s military during the 1812 war, which ended with much of Washington burned and in stalemate, both statesmen and numerous military men fought for a change. Most useful in a military change was Brigadier General Winfield Scott, who had seen officers appointed through political, business and family connections and make illogical, often self-serving decisions that cost lives of men they commanded.
One of the most significant contributions to change was Colonel Sylvanus Thayer’s “mission” to Europe. Scott and other thoughtful veterans of the 1814 debacle judged the French system of military education as the most specific, versatile, and rigorously discipline-oriented. Thayer was given 5,000 dollars to comb Europe for an institutionalized educational system that demanded those virtues, while also emphasizing the essentials of engineering. He studied for two years at the Ecole Polytechnique, while amassing a collection of scientific – and especially mathematic – texts. Another result of the 1812 war: The United States officially abandoned its reliance on militias for its defense. In 1817, Thayer became superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy and further established a rigorous curriculum still in use. One of the major reasons for the poor performance against Britain’s North American northern frontier was the lack of discipline. Many of the U.S. militia men simply refused to cross the border and headed home, never to be seen again by their commanders. Thayer, long honored as “the father of West Point,” instilled strict disciplinary standards and emphasized honorable conduct. Not only was the Point the first engineering school in the United States, but its engineering curriculum influenced all American engineering teaching prior to the Civil War.
West Point’s aim, having benefited from a surge of rapid modernization in the 1850s, was to revolutionize the way war was studied, trained and waged in the western hemisphere well beyond the “War between the States.”
This surge, and the deep changes prompted by the institutional memory of the abject failure of 1812-14, were to be tested by the “far off” Mexican-American war which erupted April 10, 1846 when General Zachary Taylor’s quartermaster, Colonel Trueman Cross, left newly constructed Fort Texas to exercise his horse up the Rio Grande. He never came back. A patrol of 26 dragoons was sent out shortly after Cross’ body was found. Their Mexican guide returned to report that the patrol had been ambushed by Mexican soldiers; 16 had been killed, the others captured. Taylor immediately sent a message to President James K. Polk saying that hostilities had commenced.
Lieutenant Ulysses S. “Sam” Grant was with Taylor as he headed south into Mexico. Monterrey surrendered to Taylor on September 25, 1846. Robert E. Lee was with Taylor for a short time, but was soon ordered to join General Winfield Scott, who had landed at Veracruz, to bombard the port city into submission with artillery. Lee’s role in positioning guns in the siege of Veracruz was later seen as his first step of the ladder toward military fame. Artillery Lieutenant Thomas Jonathan Jackson manned one of the batteries. A cannon ball came within a few steps of him, but “he paid no mind,” one of his West Point classmates said. “Old Jack was as calm in a hurricane of bullets as if he were on dress parade at West Point.” Jackson, called “Stonewall,” would become one of the most famous heroes of the Confederacy.
Taylor’s forces were sharply tested at the battle of Buena Vista facing Mexican General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. The Americans were nearly routed. It was the swift, resolute action by troops from Indiana and Mississippi that won the day. The commander of the Mississippi volunteers was Jefferson Davis, future president of the Confederacy. These battles convinced Polk that overtures for surrender were a lost effort when facing most Mexican commanders. So he assigned the majority of the hopefully best U.S. troops to Scott’s force headed for Mexico City.
At the town of Cerro Gordo, Sant Anna’s troops were well entrenched across the only passable road through mountainous terrain. Scott asked his engineers to find a route to the flank, or even the rear of the Mexican defenses. A young lieutenant, Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, believed he had seen a route through some deep jungle that would serve that purpose. Scott sent Lee and Beauregard to lead an engineering unit to try. They succeeded, and soon had the Mexican forces on the run.
Many of those West Pointers who found such resourceful, versatile and daunting solutions to cracking the Mexican defenses went into the ledgers of outstanding leaders in the Civil War on both sides. Lessons of 1812 and the Mexican War marked them, and the U.S military forever.