The cartel violence which killed 15 and injured at least 10 in Jalisco on Friday, May 1, has put Mexico’s drug war strategy back into the spotlight.
Many security experts are still unconvinced by the so-called “kingpin strategy,” where the government focuses on the top bosses, working on the belief that by taking them out the rest of the cartel will inevitably fall.
Debate also rages as to whether the military confrontation of cartels is truly effective. Former President Felipe Calderon’s deployment of the army kicked the hornet’s nest and triggered a staggering rise in homicides. Yet the other side of the coin, ignoring illegal activity, is unlikely to win the support of Mexican citizens or its neighbor to the north.
Official responses to the coordinated attacks of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG) have followed the pattern established by the previous administration.
“The full force of the Mexican state will be felt in the state of Jalisco,” National Security Commissioner Monte Alejandro Rubido said. “Satisfactory results will start to be seen very soon.”
Yet the helicopters that can be heard circling Jalisco’s capital may not provide much reassurance to locals. The wave of simultaneous disturbances was itself a response to news that the government was stepping up its efforts to fight the cartel. In a direct challenge to federal forces, hundreds of operatives set up roadblocks and burned cars, as well as fired on police and soldiers. The attacks were not random, they were a coordinated response to the the launch of an operation to capture or kill the organization’s leader, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho.”
Somewhat counter-intuitively, evidence from Mexico’s most notorious city, Ciudad Juarez, suggests that a militarized strategy increases violence, as cartels retaliate against federal force. Human rights watchdogs have also linked the strategy to a rise in torture and abuses by security forces.
While militarization has been thoroughly questioned, so has the “kingpin” strategy, as the rise of the CJNG seems to suggest that for every boss the government brings down, a new one emerges in their place.
President Enrique Pena Nieto publicly lauded the recent captures of Zetas boss Omar Treviño and Knights Templar leader Servando “La Tuta” Gomez.
Yet journalist Jo Tuckman sees a direct link between the offensive against these organizations and the emergence of the CJNG.
“Taking down the biggest kingpins has undoubtedly weakened several formerly powerful cartels, but it also appears to have provided the Jalisco-based cartel with opportunities for growth and expansion. This is particularly clear in territories once dominated by the Zetas, now a shadow of their former selves, as well as the recently dismantled Caballeros Templarios, or Knights Templar.”
The CJNG’s violent tactics have put the cartel firmly in the spotlight, and this will likely spell a short lifespan for the organization.
“The government does not have the capacity to attack more than one big group at a time,” said security expert Eduardo Guerrero. “Now it is the turn of the CJNG.”
The military undoubtedly has an excellent record in these head-on battles. Yet with at least 100,000 killed over the last eight years, authorities may need to consider a more effective long-term strategy.
“The government’s biggest challenge remains how to contain the particularly acute violence of the smaller groups that are formed after the big ones fall apart,” Guerrero said.
Security experts now agree that the most effective government offensive would be one directed at the cartel’s finances, with money launderers and banks facing direct scrutiny.
“It’s an arrest that disrupts the operational structure, but not the financial structure, the money laundering or the political structure, which remain untouched,” said Mexican journalist Ricardo Ravelo.